This work was supported by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Local Integration of NARAC with Cities (LINC) program. This program is working with pilot cities to test and demonstrate operational plume modeling tools and services from the NARAC to city agencies.
In using the information provided below, it is important to understand that NARAC plume model predictions are intended to be emergency response guidance, and are not final recommendations. The accuracy of any prediction will be limited by the accuracy of the input data, such as estimates of the material amount and the available meteorological data for the area and time of the incident. Predictions should be confirmed and refined with field measurements before making any final assessment of potential impacts. Concentrations within the inner plume model contour level may be higher than indicated due to the limited resolution of the model and due to finer scale variation in the plume air concentrations that are not simulated by the model. LLNL developed the Set 2 plots to include an estimated airborne release amount based on the choice of a surrogate chemical compound (benzene), field measurements, and a more complete meteorological analysis. The process of developing the Set 2 plots is described below. 1) CHD called the LLNL operations center and started providing air concentration measurements (see Field Measurement Appendix). These measurements were updated periodically over the next several hours.
2) Limited information was available about the burning compounds, thus benzene was chosen as a surrogate compound to estimate the possible plume toxicity (see below). The choice of benzene as a surrogate compound implies dividing the FID measurements by 6 (6 carbon atoms per benzene molecule). Benzene was selected since it is a common industrial chemical and possesses a "middle of the road" acute toxicity in relation to other organic compounds. The accuracy of this assumption and the hazard areas predicted by the plume model strongly depend on how closely the actual hazards in the plume are similar to those posed by benzene. It is important to note that sufficient data did not exist to confirm these assumptions.
Benzene has Emergency Response Planning Guidelines (ERPG) 3, 2, and 1 air concentration levels of 3130, 470, and 156 mg/m 3 , respectively. The American Industrial Hygiene Association (www.aiha.org) described the ERPG level health implications as:
-The ERPG-3 is the maximum airborne concentration below which it is believed nearly all individuals could be exposed for up to one hour without experiencing or developing lifethreatening health effects.
-he ERPG-2 is the maximum airborne concentration below which it is believed nearly all individuals could be expo for up to one hour without experiencing or developing irreversible or other serious health effects or symptom could im T sed s that pair an individual's ability to take protective -T ed action.
he ERPG-1 is the maximum airborne concentration below which it is believed nearly all individuals could be expos for up to one hour without experiencing other than mild transient adverse health effects or perceiving a clearly 3) ilable itself, would likely shift around considerably through the night if the fire remained in its current state 4) cy f d the names of several chemicals known to be present in the QCB over the phone to LLNL, the 5) s as amount is only an approximation for the amount of benzene released, assuming compounds with a toxicity 6) in se showers was not well characterized. Including rainout typically reduces airborne ) After posting the Set 2 plots to the NARAC Web, CHD directed LLNL to .
to 0.01 defined objectionable odor.
While the plume prediction was being updated to be consistent with ava field measurements, CHD called to notify LLNL that the smoke plume was shifting to areas not predicted by the Set 1 plume products. LLNL staff investigated, noted that the local surface weather stations reported light and variable (calm) winds. LLNL informed CHD of the updated weather and noted that the smoke plume, particularly near the fire and would rise vertically if the fire gained intensity.
Before the benzene plume products were shared with Cincinnati emergen response organizations, CHD called with an inventory of the QCB: 20,000 55 gal drums of which a quarter were empty fiber drums, a quarter were empty plastic drums, and half were steel drums. Of the steel drums, ~100 contained ~20 gal of organic chemicals, the remaining contained ~5 gal o organic chemicals (~51,500 gal total). CHD relaye chemicals listed had similar toxicity to benzene.
LLNL scaled the amount of benzene released to the atmosphere to be consistent with the FID measurements available and posted these product Set 2. The amount of organic chemicals released was consistent with the reported QCB inventory. It is important to note that field measurements provide only a limited sample of the variation, in time and space, of the air concentration. As such the airborne release similar to benzene were indeed released.
Both emergency responders and the National Weather Service reported scattered thundershowers. LLNL chose not to incorporate rainout effects the plume model since the spatial and temporal distribution of the pollutant concentrations and so this assumption is conservative. Hazard Released: 90 tons of benzene (a surrogate compound) was estimated be released over 12 hrs as respirable particles (uniform size distribution from to 10 µm, deposition velocity of 0.3 cm/s -consistent with fresh combustion particles) from a three-dimensional Gaussian spatial distribution (standard deviation of 18.3m) located above the QCB building (LLNL maintained the conservative assumption that the plume rise was negligible). The hazard was leased at a constant rate during the entire model run time (i.e. LLNL assumed rvations between 23:00 UTC to 3:00 UTC (Plots valid after 3:00 TC assume the winds after 3:00 UTC are identical those observed at 3:00 UTC, ire. These products illustrate the possible health impacts from the re plume, but should be used with caution since this analysis has the following lim rial has the same toxicity as benzene (which (the NARAC sion 5) used a limited set of field measurements which do not provide a complete guidance during an emergency sponse, LLNL recommends that detailed field measurements be used to etermine the potential for health impacts.
he Set lots used a benzene release rate estimated using available field measurements. The amount of organic chemicals released was consistent with the reported QCB inventory. re the fire was burning for the entire 12 hrs).
Meteorology Used: LLNL used the National Atmospheric Release Advisory Center (NARAC) system to integrated all available surface and upper air observations (~100 and 5 stations, respectively) within 25 km of the fire available that reported obse U i.e. persistence).
Plots Produced: Hourly peak 10min benzene air concentrations for the first 12 hours of the f fi itations:
1) assumes that all the toxic mate was unconfirmed), 2) does not account for rainout, 3) does not account for the generic particulate health effects model uses the particulate information only to determine the plume disper characteristics and the hazard's ability to enter the lungs), 4) only accounts for acute toxicity and does not address potential chronic effects, and sampling of the plume.
While these plume products are suitable for re d The next morning LLNL produced the Set 3 plume products as updates to t 2 benzene hazard plots with new meteorological observations, and information that fire was quenched at ~6:00 UTC (1:00 EDT). These p Hazard Released: 52.5ton of benzene (a surrogate compound) was estimated to be released over 7hrs as respirable particles (uniform size distribution from 0.01 to 10 µm, deposition velocity of 0.3 cm/s -consistent with fresh combustion particles) from a three-dimensional Gaussian spatial distribution (standard deviation of 18.3m) located at the top of the building (LLNL maintained the conservative assumption that the plume rise was negligible). The hazard was released at a constant rate during the entire model run time (i.e. LLNL assumed the fire was burning at the same intensity for the entire 7 hours).
Meteorology Used: LLNL used the National Atmospheric Release Advisory Center (NARAC) model to integrated all available surface and upper air observations (~100 and 5 stations, respectively) within 25 km of the fire that reported observations between 23:00 UTC to 14:00 UTC.
Plots Produced: Hourly peak 10 min benzene air concentrations for the first 8 hours of the fire. These products illustrate the possible health impacts from the fire plume, but should be used with caution since this analysis has the same set of limitations listed above for Set 2 calculations. While these plume products are suitable for guidance during an emergency response, LLNL recommends that detailed field measurements be used to determine the potential for health impacts. Hazard Released: 8.6 tons of benzene (a surrogate compound) was estimated to be released over 8 hrs as respirable particles (size distribution from 0.01 to 10 µm, deposition velocity of 0.3 cm/s -consistent with fresh combustion particles) from a 50 m radius circle at the surface (LLNL conservatively estimated negligible plume rise). The hazard was released at a constant rate during the entire model run time (i.e. LLNL assumed the embers smoldered for the entire 8 hours). The amount released was scaled to be consistent with the single 60 ppm FID measurement made at the corner of Guest and Evans (reported by CHD).
Meteorology Used: LLNL used NARAC system to integrate all available surface and upper air observations (~100 and 5 stations, respectively) within 25 km of the fire that reported observations between 23:00 UTC to 17:00 UTC.
Plots Produced: Hourly peak 10 min benzene air concentrations for the first 7 hours of smoldering embers. These products illustrate the possible health impacts from the fire plume, but should be used with caution since this analysis has the same set of limitations listed above for Set 2 calculations. While these plume products are suitable for guidance during an emergency response, LLNL recommends that detailed field measurements be used to determine the potential for health impacts.
Disclaimer
This work was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency of the United States Government. Neither the United States Government nor the University of California nor any of their employees, makes any warranty, express or implied, or assumes any liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of any information, apparatus, products or process disclosed, or represents that its use would not infringe privately-owned rights. Reference herein to any specific commercial products, process or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer or otherwise does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by the United States Government or the University of California. The views and opinions of authors expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of the United States Government or the University of California, and shall not be used for advertising or product endorsement purposes.
This work was produced at the University of California, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (UC LLNL) under contract W-7405-ENG-48 (Contract 48) between the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and The Regents of the University of California (University) for the operation of UC LLNL. Copyright is reserved to the University for purposes of controlled dissemination, commercialization through formal licensing, or other disposition under terms of Contract 48; DOE policies, regulations and orders; and U.S. statutes. The rights of the Federal Government are reserved under Contract 48 subject to the restrictions agreed upon by the DOE and University as allowed under DOE Acquisition Letter 97-1. LLNL used only the FID observations to estimate the emission source since, due to severe time constraints, LLNL was unable to obtain a sufficiently detailed description of the "Other" measurement technique. LLNL notes that FID detectors measure the total number of carbon atoms in the air sample. Thus the raw FID measurements were appropriately scaled to develop the benzene source term described above (e.g. [benzene] = FID/6). Benzene was used as a surrogate for chemical compounds potentially released (see discussion in the Second Set of Plume Model Products section above). This assumption was not confirmed by measurements.
LLNL chose to exclude the Edwards and Observatory observation from this analysis since the other reported values were consistent with the LLNL model typically within a factor of 2 and the Edwards location was significantly to the south of the modeled plume -consistent with eyewitness reports from this location that described the smoke plume to be "in the distance." Some figures are labeled "Not For Public Dissemination" because they are a record of the original figures used during this event.
The figures do not have that restriction now.
Set 1: Initial (Smoke) Projections
These plume model products illustrate downwind areas that may be affected by the Queen City Barrel Company fire plume using a forecast model (12km ETA). These products provide only relative concentrations. NO HEALTH AFFECTS ARE INDICATED IN THESE PLUME PRODUCTS.
Set 2: Initial Fire Plume Health Effect Estimates
These plume products illustrate the modeled health effects from the Queen City Barrel Company fire plume using local meteorological observations (persistence of the 3:00 UTC observations is assumed for plots valid at 4:00 UTC and after). This analysis incorporates a updated airborne chemical release amount compared to the Set 1 analysis. LLNL assumes that the hazard released is approximately as toxic as benzene. This assumption is unconfirmed by measurements.
Set 3: Post-analysis of the Fire Plume
These plume products use the same source term developed for Set 2, but the meteorology is based on the actual surface and upper air observations throughout the model run. LLNL assumes that the hazard released is approximately as toxic as benzene. This assumption is unconfirmed by measurements.
Set 4: Initial Smoldering Ember Health Effect Estimates
These plume products illustrate the modeled health effects from the smoldering ember plume. The compound released was assumed to be benzene and the release rate was scaled to match a single field measurement. LLNL assumes that the hazard released is approximately as toxic as benzene. This assumption is unconfirmed by measurements.
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